I have no idea what the United States should do about Israel’s attack on Iran. Well, I have ideas, but as a non-expert I have no confidence that I am correct. Unfortunately, I share my lack of expertise with the current administration.
What I do have some confidence about – in the sense that these things are accurate, not that they give me confidence that things will be handled well! – are the following:
The United States does not currently have a functional national security process; that is, institutions in place (and used) to carefully consider various options; to make sure all available relevant information is brought to bear on the situation; and to reach conclusions and execute policy.
The United States does not currently have anyone who can make definitive statements of US policy. Including the president. (Donald Trump declares policy all the time, but he’s also frequently rolled and also frequently misstates what he’s actually doing.)
There is no one in the administration who has even minimal trust from either the majority of the US or the world community during a crisis. In addition to Trump’s credibility issues, there’s no one such as Colin Powell or Leon Panetta or James Baker who foreign leaders know and trust, and who has broad bipartisan support at home.
The president refuses to be briefed and has actively arranged his administration to prevent having to confront information that might contradict his instincts.
There is a long history of things going wrong even when these conditions don’t hold. Powell turned out to be totally wrong about the Iraq War. Jimmy Carter was as well-briefed as any president but botched Iran (and more). And I could give dozens of other examples. But this doesn’t (as some contrarians or wishful thinkers might tell you) mean that Trump is less likely to botch things because nothing is set up to get anything right. No, it just means that good policy-making and execution are actually difficult in many cases, even when the process and the personnel are solid. Or at least minimally acceptable. Which is not, alas, how things are now.
Okay on to the links.
1. Great stuff from Erica Chenoweth, Soha Hammam, Jeremy Pressman, and Christopher Wiley Shay about the increased level of protests against Trump this year compared to 2017. I’m not even close to being an expert on this, but I believe this is what the actual experts have found: Protests, especially generally peaceful ones, can and have had real positive effects – that is, they can convince people on policy, or help turn people against a governing person or party. Or convince governments to change course. And that is despite the fact that protests often poll badly.
2. Barbara F. Walter on government violence against protesters.
3. Ryan Enos on where we are now.
4. Stephen M. Saideman on politicizing the military.
5. Natalie Jackson on polling Trump and policy.
6. Dan Drezner on Tulsi Gabbard.
7. Matthew Green at Mischiefs of Faction on congressional Republicans and Trump.
8. Stacie Goddard at Good Authority on Israel’s attack on Iran.
9. And Seth Masket speaks with a professor who was arrested during an LA protest this week.
The research on protests against 47 versus 45 is misleading because they compare # of protests rather than # of participants. # of protestors in 2017 likely dwarfs that of 2025 because of the Women's March. Add every protest to date on Boston Common or at the State House and they barely registerer compared to the Women's March which is like nothing I have seen.